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Scholars have notably studied Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws for his regime
typology and his writing on the separation of powers within a state. However, in recent years, a
wave of liberal internationalists have looked to Montesquieu for his commentary on the effects
of commerce in the international arena. Primarily, they cite Montesquieu for his claim that “The
natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace. Two nations that trade with each other become
reciprocally dependent; if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling” (SL,
XX.2). The innate pacifying effect of commerce is one highly regarded by Montesquieu, but it is
important to note that commerce itself is not an end all be all solution to eradicate warfare; in
fact, Montesquieu refers to the ancients (i.e. Rome and Marseilles, as well as Alexander the
Great) as examples of how war and commerce can have direct relationships with one another
(Radasanu 1).
The current state of commerce has changed due to the effects of war as well as the shift
in the type of liberty commonly practiced, which differs today from the one defined by the
Ancients. The type of commerce employed plays a pivotal role in the overall effect that
commerce can have; in some cases, transforming the natural effect of commerce to one of
exploitation. To battle the qualms of commerce executed poorly, Montesquieu advises against
monopolies of trade in goods or countries, monarchs and nobles from participating in commerce,
and certain countries so destitute that they need everything from participating in commerce at all.
Still, economic commerce can be incredibly advantageous and crucial to develop mutual
dependency, but the initial advantages of commerce are dependent on several factors, such as
security, location, tolerance, wealth, assets, and morality; yet, once commerce is engaged these
factors can be transformed by its effects. The effects of commerce may not be the perfect
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solution to establish universal, international peace, but the widespread advantages of commerce
make war an antiquated endeavor.
If commerce is to pacify nations, it must first exist between nations. Montesquieu claims
that “Commerce cures destructive prejudices, and it is an almost general rule that everywhere
there are gentle mores, there is commerce and that everywhere there is commerce, there are
gentle mores” (SL XX.1). However, there are certain circumstances that preclude commerce as
well as significant historical events that are tantamount for the growth of global commerce and
thus the increase in its power. Robert Howse points out the following:
Montesquieu claims that commerce can cure “destructive prejudices” and render manners (moeurs) gentle.
But he also, and equally emphatically, suggests that prejudices and ferocious manners impede or prevent
commerce: “[In the case of the Romans and the Parthians] far from there being commerce, there wasn’t
even communication: ambition, jealousy, religion, hatred, manners kept everything apart.” Does not then
the disease itself prevent the proposed cure? (Howse 2)

Howse is correct in his assessment that the disease, destructive mores, can prevent
commerce from existing, but only to a degree. It is not enough for a nation to refuse commerce
with another nation based on destructive mores to be unaffected by that nation’s commerce.
Though two nations may refuse to trade with each other, if they permit any level of commerce to
exist, there is the potential for indirect contact. The most immediate form of indirect contact
would be if both nations who refuse to trade with each other have no such restriction on trade
with a third nation. In this way, “Commerce has spread knowledge of the mores of all nations
everywhere; they have been compared to each other, and good things have resulted from this”
(SL XX.1). Therefore, while it is possible for the disease to prevent the cure in certain extreme
cases, the power of commerce has reached a high enough degree that resisting its effects
becomes incredibly difficult. This difficulty does not remove the possibility that two nations may
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never trade together because of destructive mores, but adds pressure for the two nations to
change their mores based on each other despite a lack of direct commerce.
A large portion of Montesquieu’s writings on commerce is the result of reflecting on past
events. The history of commerce includes many significant changes that helped develop the
commerce that exists today, including the creation of superior ships, the compass, and letters of
exchange. The influential power that commerce held was limited by the extent it could travel, so
as different developments made commerce a more viable option globally, the effect that
commerce had on mores increased. In the case of shipbuilding, there were limitations on how far
the ships could travel as well as in which direction. Without a doubt, the way a ship is built
factors into the speed in which in travels. Montesquieu examines “this slowness of the Indians
ships, which in an equal time, could go but a third of the distance covered by the Greek and
Roman ships… The Indian ships made of rushes drew less water than the Greek and Roman
vessels made of wood joined with iron” (SL XXI.6). In this case, due to the speed and size
differences of Indian ships vis-à-vis Greek and Roman ships, the ships of the Greeks and
Romans could carry more cargo for greater distances, enabling them to trade with greater
advantages and to reach locations that would be too difficult or of too little profit to Indian ships.
Moreover, the way ships had to travel before the creation of the compass limited the
reach of commerce, for “In those times, navigators were obliged to follow the coast, which was
their compass, so to speak” (SL XXI.6). The limitations on travel meant that alternative routes
were highly sought after and expeditions to discover different trade routes were attempted
multiple times. For instance, “We learn from history that before the discovery of the compass,
there were four attempts to sail around Africa”, but such a trip was too difficult and until the
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compass it was more “natural to engage in commerce with east Africa by way of the Red Sea”
(SL XXI.10).
As history proves and Montesquieu writes, “The compass opened the universe, so to
speak. Discovery was made of Asian and Africa of which only some coasts had been known, and
of America, which had been completely unknown” (SL XXI.21). The discovery of two new
worlds strengthened commerce and extended its reach to new locations, thus making commerce
more appealing to many powerful nations, such as the French, English, Spanish, Dutch, and
Portuguese. Furthermore, the colonization of America established strong commerce between
colonies and their mother countries. With the constant improvement of shipbuilding and
navigation, the strength and reach of commerce is enhanced and accelerated, making it more
difficult for destructive mores, the disease, to prevent commerce from spreading gentle mores,
the cure.
A vital invention for the survival of commerce to grow to the extent at which it exists
today occurred from the creation of letters of exchange. Montesquieu notes that when the
philosophy of Aristotle was accepted by the great minds of the West, they made no distinction
between the explanations of lending at interest with commerce; thus deeming commerce an act
conducted by not only mean, but dishonest people as well. The mistake made in condemning
commerce, a naturally permitted and potentially necessary thing, led to the persecution of Jews
in order to take their wealth by force. Moreover, this labeling of commerce with infamy led to
the confiscation of many goods owned by the Jews (who prospered greatly from commerce), and
if not for the invention of letters of exchange, the property of those who had gained from
commerce would have continued to be collected by those with power, and commerce would
remain to be associated with the most horrible usuries (SL XXI.20). The letters of exchange

Moore 6

ensured that commerce could travel internationally while avoiding violence, for “the richest
trader had only invisible goods, which could be sent everywhere and leave no trace anywhere”
(SL XXI.20).
The power of commerce to cure destructive mores is one that has grown throughout
history through the advancement of shipbuilding, navigation, and letters of exchange. This
ability to pacify nations is one too complex to be as simple as a vaccine for a disease. While
commerce has advantages and characteristics that make mutual dependency more tempting than
war, commerce does not necessarily eliminate war, but rather reduces the reasons for war to
exist. This results in commerce creating and benefiting from the existence of war to a degree that
makes war less viable with commerce than without. The relationship between war and
commerce, as described by Montesquieu, can be viewed both idealistically and realistically.
Idealistically, the effects of commerce make war less advantageous and thus less
desirable to nations who would rather maximize their benefits by participating in commerce.
Through an intricate system of trade routes, economical gain, and competitive advantage, a
system of mutual dependency would defray any motivation for war; establishing the end result of
international peace theory: no war. However, while Montesquieu points out that the “natural
effect of commerce is to lead to peace” (SL XX.1), he examines the reality of the situation and
historical events to address the fact that the motivations for war may be hampered by commerce
but are in no way eliminated. The effect commerce has on war is one that leads to peace, yet
there is no guarantee how long it may take for commerce to lead nations to peace, or if peace will
actually be secured in all circumstances. Moreover, as is the case for the relationship between
Marseilles and Rome, a nation’s commerce can benefit from war.
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In earliest times there were great wars between Carthage and Marseilles over fishing grounds. After the
peace they both engaged in economic commerce. Marseilles was the more jealous because, while equaling
its rival in industry, it had become inferior in power; this is the reason for its great faithfulness to the
Romans. The war the Romans waged against the Carthaginians in Spain was a source of wealth for
Marseilles, which served as their storehouse. The ruin of Carthage and Corinth increased further the glory
of Marseilles (SL XXI.11)

Though Marseilles was not the actual nation to wage war with Carthage and Corinth, they
had a vested interest to side with the nation that did: Rome. In this circumstance, war is not
prevented by commerce, but neither is commerce the instigator. Though Marseilles had a
commercial interest in the war on Carthage, Montesquieu argues that “The Romans were never
notable for jealousy over commerce. It was as a rival nation and not as a commercial nation that
they attacked Carthage” (SL XXI.14). Therefore, the relationship between Marseilles and Rome
proves that Montesquieu understood there were commercial advantages to go to war, and he
turned to an examination of Athens and Alexander to the Great for ways in which war has helped
contribute to the development of commerce.
The relationship between the commerce of Athens and war is not explicitly stated in The
Spirt of the Laws, however, it is implied by Montesquieu that a greater utilization of their naval
powers would have significantly improved their benefits from commerce. Though the use of
their navy does not specifically mean for conquest purposes, such an option can be inferred by
Montesquieu’s writings as one of the possible choices to enhance the commercial enterprises of
Athens. The error that Athens made, and Montesquieu notes, is that Athens failed to use the
entirety of the resources at their disposal.
Athens, filled with projects for glory… more attentive to extending its maritime empire than to using it,
with a political government such that the common people distributed the public revenues to themselves
while the rich were oppressed, did not engage in the great commerce promised it by the work of its mines,
the multitude of its slaves, the number of its sailors, its authority over the Greek towns, and, more than all
that, the fin institutions of Solon. Its trading was limited almost entirely to Greece and the Black Sea, from
which it drew its sustenance. (SL XXI.7).
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Athens was poised to extend its commerce to a global level that would have turned their
sustainable trading system into one of immense prosperity. At the very least, Athens could have
established more trading routes to increase the size and reach of their commerce; they certainly
had the necessary access to trade outposts, ships, and manpower to do so. If, for whatever reason,
a nation would be unwilling to take part in commerce with Athens or more locations needed to
be found in order to extend commerce, Athens could have used their maritime powers to do so.
While Athens might have been able to use their maritime powers to find new trade locations
without resorting to conquest, Montesquieu’s understanding of the ancients meant the sea-based
method for Athens to maximize its commerce was conquest. Though “Today one discovers lands
by sea voyages; in early times, one discovered seas by conquest of lands” (SL XXI.9). Still,
despite the advantages Athens had to increase participation in commerce, its fundamental
reliance on virtue made commercial engagement intrinsically undesirable and potentially harmful
to its future survival, thus deterring Athens from strengthening its commercial reach.
Where Athens failed to engage in war to extend its commerce, Alexander the Great
succeeded. “Montesquieu’s portrayal of Alexander, which abstracts from this conqueror’s love
of glory and his masterful capacity to achieve it, suggests that we ought to assess his
accomplishments in light of the progress that would follow him” (Radasanu 10). The success that
Alexander had in strengthening maritime commerce came after he conquered the Indies. It is
important to note that it was not the conquest of the Indies that strengthened maritime commerce,
for, in fact, the Persians had reached as far the Indus and would have been able to trade with the
Indies had their religious values not barred them from the idea of maritime commerce (SL
XXI.8). Rather, Alexander’s success was from his “design of uniting the Indies with the west by
a maritime commerce” (SL XXI.8) and the fact that in trying to strengthen commerce Alexander
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did not allow himself to be constrained by religious prejudices. Even though other factors
differentiated the great commercial enterprises that Alexander was able to undertake in
comparison to Persia, Alexander would not have been able to do anything had he not mobilized
his forces to conquer new lands.
The relationship between commerce and war may have the natural effect of leading to
peace, but the consideration of Rome and Marseilles as well as Alexander the Great prove that
commerce and war can have other effects. Though commerce can benefit indirectly and directly
from war, there is a progression throughout history that has made Montesquieu’s initial statement
(that commerce leads to peace) increasingly true. One such progression can be seen through the
improvement of ships, which combined with the invention of the compass, made navigation
through sea voyages more efficient than navigation via land, and opened the world to itself.
Additionally, the difference between the liberty of the Ancients and the liberty that Montesquieu
associates with England affects the success of commerce.
The significance of liberty and commerce is one that exists independent of whether the
liberty is that of the Ancients or that of England. Liberty is vital for commerce to exist, for
without liberty, commerce could not function properly. On a fundamental level, commerce needs
the aspect of liberty that guarantees property rights; without a guarantee of property, there is no
real reason for commerce to occur, otherwise the work an individual puts in to benefit from
commerce could easily be confiscated. For instance, in a despotic state, Montesquieu notes that
discussing the kind of commerce that occurs “is useless to talk about [for there is a g]eneral rule:
in a nation that is in servitude, one works more to preserve than to acquire; in a free nation, one
works more to acquire than to preserve” (SL XX.4).
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This discrepancy falls back to the fact that in a despotic state, if an individual prospers,
their prosperity can be removed within the bounds of the constitution. Without their liberty,
especially property rights, the goal of an individual is to preserve their current livelihood in the
hopes that future action from the despot will not detriment them even further. However, the
existence of liberty is not enough for there to be truly successful commerce. “If Corinth is a
guidepost, then we might conclude that commerce requires freedom of the passions and the
absence of virtue since virtue would subject the individual desires and interests to the will of the
city as a whole” (Radasanu 5). As Athens showcases, the liberty of the Ancients, when focused
on virtue, can not lead to the same level of successful commerce as the liberty that exists in
modern times.
Liberty as viewed by the Ancients is not the same as the liberty Montesquieu associates
with England and commercial success. The liberty of the ancients focuses on the group (virtue)
whereas the liberty of England focuses on the liberty of the individual. When considering the
goals and values that an individual would have when attempting to engage in commerce, the
liberty of the Ancients is one that is not conducive to commerce. This can be seen through
Montesquieu’s discussion on Athens. While Athens had an impressive maritime force and all the
resources necessary to create large-scale, successful commerce, the focus on subjecting the
individual to the interests of the group were too heavy of a burden for a truly successful
commerce, for if Athens succeeded commercially, then its values would be corrupted and its
military would fail. Therefore, the type of commerce that Athens needed had to be regulated by
frugal mores, but the spirit of commerce does not align with frugality (Radasanu 5). The position
that Athens was in meant their commerce was not successful enough to off-set the devaluation of
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their virtue, but Athens was simply not frugal enough to maintain their virtue, leading “us to
conclude that [Montesquieu] finds neither its virtue nor its commerce impressive” (Radasanu 5).
The fact that the Ancients valued the success of the group over the liberty of the
individual does not mean that traders in modern times are free to do whatever they wished. In
fact, “this would instead be the servitude of commerce. That which hampers those who engage in
commerce does not, for all that, hamper commerce. It is in countries of liberty that the trader
finds innumerable obstacles; the laws never thwart him less than in countries of servitude” (SL
XX.12). The subjugation of traders to the policies of the nation to serve the greater good of
commerce is similar to virtue in that both place an emphasis on the success of the state, but the
former remains free to pursue their passions within the confines of policies, whereas the latter
must continuously place the interests of the city as whole over individual interests. Another
difference between the liberty of the Ancients and modern liberty is that for his example of
modern liberty in England, there is no suggestion for traders to moderate their commercial
endeavors; frugality is not a concern.
For Montesquieu, England is the closest to a perfect model for the way a nation should
conduct itself politically and economically. England is a nation “made comfortable by peace and
liberty, freed from destructive prejudices… inclined to become commercial” (SL XIX.27). With
a strong coordination of its legislative, executive, and judicial powers, England earns the trust of
all of its citizens that security is provided. The sense of security in their liberty and the way
England conducts political interests, make commercial ventures very tempting for individuals.
Though English traders may be hampered by English law, they are ultimately free to be as
successful as possible, for there is no need for frugality or moderation to preserve their virtue,
because virtue is not what guarantees their security.
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Their security is guaranteed by the understanding between the state and individuals that if
the state is endangered, so too is the livelihood of the individual, thus providing sufficient
incentive for individuals to follow the laws and to give the necessary resources to remain safe in
the nation they reside. Therefore, a trader can have an immense amount of prosperity, despite
having obstacles placed before him. Though the trader finds new difficulties on an individual
level, with all traders being hampered in favor of commerce, all traders take part in a greater
commerce because of their individual sacrifices.
The success of English traders is in part because the liberty of England is well
coordinated with the other aspects of the country. For Montesquieu, England provides the
template for how commerce should be employed by a nation:
Other nations have made commercial interests give way to political interests: England has always
made its political interests give way to the interests of commerce.
This is the people in the world who have best known how to take advantage of each of these three
great things at the same time: religion, commerce, and liberty (SL XX.7)

England facilitates commerce to such a degree, that their power derives, in large part, from its
commercial success. As their commerce expands, so too does their power; and when their power
extended to America, it brought forth the question of whether or not the commerce established
by colonialism is exploitative, a question which can then be extended to commerce between
nations who benefit disproportionately.
If exploitation is based solely on economic gain, than the relationship between a mother
country and its colonies would definitely classify as an exploitative relationship, but the benefits
of commerce are more than just economic gain. The benefits of commerce can be peace between
nations through mutual dependency, the softening of destructive mores through interactions and
comparisons of different mores from different nations, and security for colonies or smaller
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nations through an economically disproportionate relationship with a mother country or larger
nation.
The purpose of these colonies is to engage in commerce under better conditions than one has with
neighboring peoples with whom all advantages are reciprocal. It has been established that only the mother
country can trade with the colony, and this was done with a very good reason…
The disadvantage to the colonies, which lose the liberty of commerce, is visibly compensated by
the protection of the mother country, which defends them by her arms or maintains them by her laws (SL
XXI.21).

The purpose in these two circumstances is not for the colony of small nation to succeed in
commerce in the same way that a new town or empire would; rather the goal is to extend
commerce through the creation of a colony and provide security to that colony through the
strength of the mother country. Similarly, a small nation can gain the strength of a larger nation
by disadvantaging itself commercially. The give and take of benefits that account for the
disproportionate economic gain makes this type of relationship not exploitative
However, there are situations in which commerce can be exploitative. Montesquieu
separates commerce into two categories: economic and luxury. These two types of commerce
tend to be associated with certain constitutions. “In government by one alone, it is ordinarily
founded on luxury, and though it is also founded on real needs, its principal object is to
procure… all that serves its arrogance, its delights, and its fancies. In government by many, it is
more often founded on economy” (SL XX.4). While it is not impossible for a monarchy to
engage in economic commerce, such as the constitutional monarchy of England, a monarchy
tends to engage in luxury commerce. The exploitative effects that commerce can cause are
mostly, if not entirely, a result of the aspects of luxury commerce. The exploitation is a result of
the despot, monarch, or ruling class taking advantage of commerce to satiate their ostentatious
desires. Though economic commerce can be influenced in a similar way by the elite to be
corrupted into luxury commerce and thus potentially exploitative, there exist aspects of
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economic commerce that appear similar to aspects of luxury commerce, but are actually different
enough to not be exploitative.
The most visible similarity is in the way that the government can interact to impose
restrictions on traders. A government that places regulations on economic commerce does so to
improve the overall welfare of commerce, but a ruler or ruling class that confines commerce to
mandates that establish a regulation to line their coffers does so at the expense of the nation. This
type of commerce and regulation, such as the Colonial commerce of Spain, “does not depend on
the industry of the nation, the number of inhabitants, nor the cultivation of the earth. The king of
Spain… is in this respect but a very rich individual in a very poor state” (Howse 10). Moreover,
the regulations of the ruler or ruling class in a luxury commerce tend to establish monopolies that
help garner wealth for those who establish the policies; these monopolies limit trade and traders
in a way that is not beneficial to the overall welfare of commerce, but to the overall wealth of the
ruler(s),
Due to the potentially exploitative nature of luxury commerce and the possibility of
economic commerce transforming into luxury commerce, Montesquieu outlines several rules of
commerce that should not be broken lest the commerce turn from one of general advantage to
that of an exploitative and/or destructive nature. As previously discussed, the implementation of
monopolies through government (in)action is one such occurrence to avoid, for a monopoly
limits trade to the degree where it is less advantageous for those forced to trade with the one who
holds the monopoly because the monopoly can adjusts their price in an uncontrollable manner, a
price that is naturally regulated by commercial competition. The lack of accountability
associated with a government created monopoly having virtually unlimited power is similar to
the reason that a monarch should not participate in commerce. commerce.

Moore 15

If a monarch was to participate in commerce, they would be the most powerful trader
there was, with nothing to stop them from being the most successful trader in their nation. The
example Montesquieu uses for why rulers should not engage in commerce is found in
Theophilus, who burned a ship carrying goods for his wife, telling her “I am the emperor… and
you make me a shipmaster. How can the poor people earn a living if we too ply their trade?” (SL
XX.19). Montesquieu adds further that no one could stop the monarch from making monopolies
and no one could force a monarch to pay his debts. This kind of advantage in commerce that the
monarch holds is one of sheer exploitation, for the rules of commerce do not apply, effectively
hampering the individual and commerce for the proprietary ventures of the ruler.
Similarly, the nobility of a monarchy should not participate in commerce either, because
if the nobility was to participate in commerce, merchants and plebeians would have a harder time
buying and selling (SL XX.21). The involvement of the nobility in commerce is one of inherent
disadvantage, while the nobility are innately more powerful in a monarchy, they would partake
in commerce easier than their merchant/plebian counterpart without providing any real benefits
to commerce. While there is a natural advantage for nobles to engage in commerce that can
potentially harm the commerce of the lower class, the more important damaging factor is that “It
is against the spirit of monarchy for the nobility to engage in commerce. The usage that
permitted commerce to the nobility in England is one of the things that most contributed to
weakening monarchical government there” (SL XX.21). For a nobility to participate in
commerce, the goal of the nobility is more than likely to shift away from that of honor, which is
necessary for a monarchy to stay strong.
If the nobility is more focused on partaking in the business of merchants and plebeians,
then the structural support to the monarchy’s military power crumbles. The nobility are a group
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who live and die for their monarch; “who go to war so that no one will dare to say they did not
go; who expect honors when they cannot expect wealth, and when they do not get wealth,
console themselves because they have acquired honor” (SL XX.22). If the nobility instead values
wealth over honor, as would happen if the nobility engages in commerce, then the strength of the
monarchy would fluctuate with the strength of its fortune. This would ultimately be a detriment
to the strength of the monarchy, for honor can be held even in times the worst of circumstances,
but wealth fluctuates to a greater degree, leaving the kingdom unnecessarily weaker in time
turmoil.
The negative effect on commerce from the participation of a monarch and/or the nobility
is one that exploits its own people. Unlike the colonial commerce of Spain, which skipped the
involvement of its own people, commerce that involves the monarch and/or the nobility
diminishes the power of everyone else. This exploitation of the people causes their livelihood to
deteriorate in order for the elite to quench their thirst for luxuries. While commerce can be
disadvantageous when the monarch or nobility participates, the government as a whole
establishing trade companies is supported by Montesquieu. These government created trading
companies can then form monopolies that enable the government to reap the benefits of
commerce in what initially appears to go against Montesquieu’s stance on monopolies. However,
the benefits the government can receive from this sort of establishment outweigh the negatives
associated with monopolies when they are created via trading companies. When monarchs and
the nobility engage in commerce, it causes a type of exploitation that is harmful to commerce;
yet even with this exploitation, most nations continue to benefit from conducting commerce,
with the exception of countries like Poland, where luxury commerce is harmful and the nation
would be better off not participating in commerce at all.
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Poland is a nation whose entire population is under the control of a few lords who possess
entire provinces. The lords “oppress the plowmen in order to have a greater quantity of grain to
send to foreigners and procure for themselves the things their luxury demands. If Poland had
commerce with no nation, its people would be happier” (SL XX.23). The people of Poland
would be happier because without the commerce of luxury, the lords would have no reason to
oppress them, meaning the people would be able to enjoy more of the grain their work is able to
produce. Though Poland would have benefitted from having no commerce with other nations,
due to the extent commerce has reached globally and the interests of the elite, such an occurrence
would have been highly unlikely.
As previously described, the strengthening of commerce through conquest and navigation
has made commerce a global phenomenon that reaches even the farthest corners of the world.
Commerce as a general rule may be advantageous, yet the advantage for everyone who
participates in commerce varies. For the nation of Poland, commerce exploits the people so that
the elite can live a luxurious life, and if the monarch or nobility partake in commerce similar
exploitations can occur. Suffice to say, it is the elite who have the most to gain from luxury
commerce, but this is not the type of commerce that Montesquieu promotes. Luxury commerce
as a whole is detrimental to the nations who participate in it, even if monopolies are avoided. As
Montesquieu points out, luxury commerce can weaken the spirit of a monarchy and exploit a
nation’s people to the extent that the nation would be better off not participating in commerce
with other nations. For these reasons, Montesquieu turns to economic commerce as the procurer
of gentle mores and peace.
Unlike luxury commerce, which involves the buying and selling of unnecessary material
goods, economic commerce involves the trading of goods that nations and individuals actually
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need. Since the two parties involved in economic commerce each gain something they need by
trading with the other, they establish a mutual dependency, for as long as both parties need
something that the other has to offer and is willing to trade, there is an incentive to continue
obtaining those goods through commerce, whereas war would ruin the commercial relationship;
potentially causing a nation to lose its access to a commodity it needs. This mutual dependency
is why economic commerce, and not luxury commerce, is the type of commerce that naturally
leads to peace.
Still, while economic commerce can potentially lead to a mutual dependency that deters
the desire for war; there are still differences in how advantageous economic commerce is for a
nation. The amount of advantage a nation has in participating in commerce varies based on
factors, such as security, location, tolerance, wealth, assets, and morality. For many nations, the
benefits of commerce are purely monetary; they seek to increase their fortune through
commerce, but for other nations, the benefits of commerce have no real monetary value and are
worth commercial disadvantages to obtain.
One such benefit of commerce worth disadvantages via trade is that of security. Security
is a large concern for any nation, for a nation without security is susceptible to outside invasion,
and a people without security are prone to rebellion from within. Athens maintained its security
by its virtue, for individuals were willing to lay down their lives because the city valued the
whole over that of the individual. While England maintains its security because its individuals
are willing to put in whatever resources are necessary to ensure the nation they live and invest in
remains safe. However, some nations lack the population, resources, or military armaments to
guarantee their security.
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When such a circumstance exists, this nation must ally itself with a stronger nation to
obtain the security benefits associated with the alliance. During the era of the Ancients, a small
nation may have been conquered or joined to an empire, such as the Persian or Roman Empire,
for new trade routes were discovered by conquest. This would tie the nation’s security to that of
the empire it was a part of, which strengthened the security overall, but gave the nation little
power in controlling its security. This relationship is very similar to the relationship between a
colony and its mother country, for if the mother country suffers, so too does the colony.
The utilization of commerce makes it unnecessary for a nation to tie its fate to the
security of another nation, while still providing the opportunity for a small nation to be protected
by a larger one. In the case of Marseilles, it was vital that they had “frugal mores, in order to live
always by a commerce that they would the more surely preserve the less it was advantageous to
them” (SL XX.5). By having frugal mores, Marseilles minimized their costs to ensure that
whomever they traded with could have the best deals; the better the deal, the more likely a nation
would continue trading with Marseilles. The preservation of commerce due to incredible deals
and the minimal military threat that it poses makes Marseilles a valuable trading partner, giving
it the chance to ally itself with powerful nations, like Rome, in order to garner security.
Marseilles succeeded in economic commerce because of the advantages it gave to other
commercial traders in order to secure its own commerce. Living by frugal mores is what made
Marseilles capable of ensuring the longevity of its economic commerce, but why could
Marseilles succeed in maintaining frugal mores where Athens had failed? Athens, which had a
powerful maritime empire and all the resources necessary to succeed in economic commerce, did
not work to extend its commerce. Despite having all the necessary requirements to succeed,
Athens did not have great economic commerce because it was focused on “projects for glory”

Moore 20

(SL XXI.7). All things considered, Athens was in a position where it did not need economic
commerce to survive; though Montesquieu points out that Athens would have had greater
prosperity had it increased its influence through commerce, their survival was tied to their virtue.
Contrarily, Marseilles was reliant on commerce to survive; without commerce, Marseilles
would have fallen. Due to its location (and its assets which will be discussed in greater detail
later) Marseilles was reliant on commerce for its subsistence. “Marseilles, a necessary retreat in
the midst of a stormy sea, Marseilles, where all the winds, the shoals, and the coastline order
ships to put in, was frequented by sea-faring people” (SL XX.5). The sole advantage that
Marseilles had was its location. The location of a nation can ultimately decide its commercial
success; while other factors can be crucial to the amount of success, without a good location,
where commerce can grow with minimal oppression, there is no inception of commerce.
Even though the location is vital for commerce to exist and a good location can be pivotal
for the success of the commerce that springs up there, there is not real limitation on what
constitutes a viable location. In fact, Montesquieu points out that commerce “sometimes
destroyed by conquerors, sometimes hampered by monarchs, wanders across the earth, flees
from where it is oppressed, and remains where it is left to breath: it reign today where one used
to see only deserted places, seas, and rocks; there where it used to reign are now only deserted
places” (SL XXI.5). Commerce can transform even the most barren of locations, like the land
Marseilles was built on, into an epicenter of trade.
Though not the ideal circumstances for commerce to begin, commerce finds safe haven in
locations previously considered uninhabitable, for those are the locations where no monarch
reigns and conquerors care not to travel. It is there, “that violence and harassment have brought
forth economic commerce among men who are constrained to hide in marshes, on islands, on the
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shoals, and even among dangerous reefs” (SL XX.5). Like Marseilles, the people who engage in
commerce in these locations need economic commerce for their subsistence and their security.
Commerce has the capability to spring up in a multitude of locations, but the way a location is
used and the natural advantages of a location help determine the success that commerce has
there.
A nation that used its location masterfully is Montesquieu example Corinth:
Corinth was admirably well situated; it separated two seas, opened and shut the Peloponnesus, and opened
and shut Greece. It was a town of the greatest importance in a time when the Greek people were a world,
and the Greek towns, nations. It did a greater commerce than Athens, It had one port to receive
commodities from Asia; it had another to receive those from Italy; for, as there were great difficulties in
going around Cape Malea, where opposing winds meet causing shipwrecks, one preferred to go to Corinth
where vessels could even be carried overland from one sea to another. (SL XXI.7)

Corinth’s success in commerce was, in large part, due to their location, specifically, the benefits
that ships had in traveling to Corinth instead of venturing around Cape Malea. Like Marseilles,
the convenience associated with the location facilitated the arrival of numerous sea-faring
people, thus resulting in commerce. However, the enormous success of Corinth was also a result
of the various nations who went there for commerce.
In the example Corinth, commerce succeeded because they, at the very least, tolerated
other nations enough to allow trade to exist. The importance of a nation being tolerant enough to
make way for commerce can also be seen in the example of England, who let their political
interests give way to their commercial interests (SL XX.7) as well as Alexander the Great, who
removed the religious barriers preventing successful commerce to be brought to the Indies (SL
XXI.8). In all three of these examples, commerce succeeded because it was open to as many
nations as possible, for (in almost all circumstances) one who engages in commerce benefits
most when allowing all nations to participate, and therefore loses many opportunities upon
limiting who it trades with.
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Prior to Alexander the Great, the Persian Empire did not bring trade to the Indies because
their religious beliefs prevented them from even considering maritime commerce. In this case, a
self-imposed limitation on commerce hampers the overall success. A nation that is more tolerant
will have a greater advantage in commerce, for the nation will be willing to include more nations
in its commerce. Contrarily, a nation that is not tolerant, will exclude others from its commerce.
The lesson of tolerance extends to other ideologies about commerce that involve precluding trade
with other nations without great reason. One such nation that suffers commercially is that of
Japan:
The Japanese trade with only two nations, the Chinese and the Dutch. The Chinese earn a thousand percent
on sugar and sometimes as much on return commodities. The Dutch make about the same profit. Any
nation guided by the maxims of the Japanese will necessarily be deceived. It is competition that puts a just
price on goods and establishes the true relations between them. (SL XX.9)

The Japanese lose the benefit of competition when they limit their trade. With more
competition vying for the same trade, Japan would be able to accept the lowest prices for buying
and the highest prices for selling. For this reason, opening trade to as many nations as possible is
vital to see all of the options and useful to have different nations compete to make the best offer.
While the general rule is that competition puts a fair price on goods and a nation should not limit
with whom it trades, there is an exception “for a poor nation, which willingly abandons the
expectation of becoming rich, provided it has secured its sustenance” (SL XX.9). In these
circumstances, a poor nation will make a deal to trade with only one nation in order to secure a
fixed price that guarantees its survival.
The exception made for poor nations to accept a disadvantaged commerce so that its
commerce can survive is a result of the different way commerce affects nations of varying
wealth. The wealth-based differences can be seen at four levels: extreme wealth, moderate
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wealth, poor wealth, and destitute wealth. A nation that is extremely wealthy and capable of
engaging in the commerce easily itself can do so by only supplying commodities produced in its
country and by permitting trade only with ships built in its own country (SL XX.8). Though this
is not an ideal situation for commerce, if the nation is capable and wealthy enough, it can do so.
Still, a wealthy nation has the most to gain from engaging in commerce. Consider Montesquieu’s
example of Japan:
The excessive quantity of what it can accept produces the excess of what it can send out: things will be in
equilibrium as if imports and exports were moderate, and besides, this kind of inflation will produce a
thousand advantages for the state; there will be more consumption, more things on which the arts can be
exercised, more men employed, more means of acquiring power… It is hard when a country does not have
superfluous things, but it is the nature of commerce to make superfluous things useful and useful ones
necessary. (SL XX.23).

With an immense amount of wealth comes an immense amount of opportunities, all of
which favor the wealthier nation. These advantages do not extend to a moderately wealth nation,
but, like a wealthy nation, a nation of moderate wealth continues to advantage most from
extending its commerce as far as possible and including as many nations as possible. A wealthy
nation can afford to limit its trade to a degree that a nation of moderate wealth can not. The rule
of thumb that is to be applied to nations of moderate wealth is the same rule that Montesquieu
applies to Spain: “it is suitable for it to put the fewest obstacles in the way of commerce that its
policy can permit” (SL XXI.23). The best example of policy is that of England who always puts
its commercial interests before its political ones. Still, this is not something that all nations do,
and the values associated with religion and politics are not to be discounted, but if the nation
seeks to act in the best interest of its commerce, it will obstruct it as little as possible.
Of course, the minimal obstruction of commerce is targeted to nations who aim to
maximize their profits, such as wealthy and moderately wealthy nations. However, the goal of a
poor nation differs from that of their wealthier counterparts because they must first obtain the
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goods necessary for their survival; then, and only then, does maximizing profits become a
reality. Therefore, where it is imperative for a wealthier nation to leave commerce unobstructed,
a poor nation may find the best option to be one that disadvantages it commercially, such as
creating an agreement to only trade with one nation “on the pretext that it will take all of it at a
certain price…many kings of the Indies have similar contracts with the Dutch for spices” (SL
XX.9). While the agreement is detrimental to their commerce as a whole, it guarantees their
survival.
In the case of a poor nation, it may be most beneficial to restrict trade to an extreme
degree, but a nation so destitute that it cannot even benefit from a disadvantageous agreement of
commerce may be better off not engaging in commerce at all. This nation will have little to zero
access to the moveable goods of other nations and very little access to its own as well. Moreover,
its land will be owned not by its citizens, but by foreigners. Having a desperate need for
everything with the ability to gain nothing, this nation would only disadvantage itself by
engaging in commerce and would be better off trading with no nation (SL XX.23). Therefore, “it
is not the nations who need nothing that lose by carrying commerce; it is those who need
everything. It is not the peoples who have enough among themselves but those who have nothing
at home who find it advantageous to trade with no one” (SL XX.23).
Presumably, the relationship between wealth and commerce should be similar to the
relationship between assets and commerce, but the reality of all too many situations has made
this to not be true. Theoretically, as with wealth, the more valuable assets that a nation possesses,
the more advantages it should have in commerce, which would be true if the disposition of the
people who accessed the commodities was universal. However, due to variation in people’s
disposition as a result of the assets they possess those whom nature has given plenty gain less
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from commerce compared to those who nature has given little. This distinction can be seen most
accurately by the South and North people of Europe. “The first have all sorts of the comforts of
life and few needs; the second have many needs and few of the comforts of life. To the former,
nature had given much, and they ask but little of it; to the others nature gives little, and they ask
much of it” (SL XXI.3).
The South which possesses many of the resources necessary to secure the wealthiest of
lifestyles does not utilize the resources it has efficiently, whereas the North possesses little and
work incredibly hard with the resources they have in order to scrounge up a living. The increased
efficiency that the North has from participating in commerce stems from their reliance on
commerce in order to survive. They worked hard to turn what few resources they possessed into
successful economic commerce. In fact, economic commerce tends to occur most for those who
have no assets. It is important to distinguish no assets from the possession of nothing, for the
possession of nothing (or almost nothing) is a destitute state of wealth that does not benefit from
commerce.
A major difference between destitution and the possession of little to no assets is that
those who are destitute are not capable of making ends meet because even their labor does not
provide for themselves. Oftentimes, this can occur from the land they work being owned by
someone else, meaning they receive a meager portion of the labor they conduct. Another such
circumstance can be seen in a despotic state, where all labor is subject to the whim of the despot,
and therefore no amount of labor will raise the individual from poverty. Similarly, but
significantly different, the lack of assets does not remove the potential gain from an individual’s
hard work; thus the more effort and diligence that an individual puts in, the more they can garner
from the world around them.
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Individuals who possess no assets still possess their liberty and their land (or the land
they work on is owned by the nation they work for and not foreigners). On the other hand,
individuals who possess nothing lack the liberty necessary for their labor to significantly factor
into their accumulation of wealth. It is this distinction between those without assets and those
who are destitute that classifies the two types of poor peoples:
those that the harshness of the government has rendered such; and these are incapable of hardly any virtue,
because their poverty is part of their servitude; the others are only poor for having disdained, or not having
known the commodities of life; and these can do great things, for their poverty is part of their liberty. (SL
XX.3).

Those who are poor, yet retain their liberty, find a great advantage in economic commerce,
which is why Marseilles turned to economic commerce. Its people, having seen the barrenness of
its territory and having a strong will to work hard, did what they had to in order to live. “[I]n
order to replace that which nature refused them… they drew their livelihood from the whole
universe” (SL XX.5).
For nations, the success of commerce is a result of the progress that commerce has made
throughout history. The progress of which is one that occurred in conjunction with the progress
of war. Montesquieu expresses a strong belief that commerce has surpassed war in terms of
international relations; that nations should conduct commerce with each other for it is more
advantageous than attempting to destroy the each other through military conquest.
First of all he explains how progress in military engineering has made conquest nearly impossible. He also
exposes how the moral evolution in Europe means that conquest is no longer economically satisfying.
Montesquieu states that the jus gentium has changes since the time of the Roman Empire and that pillages
and massacres among European countries are no longer morally acceptable. This moral impossibility of
pillage has made conquest too expensive and the spoils too meagre for it to be a worthwhile practice. (Long
92).

The concern of morality is the final concern that determines the degree of advantage a state has
in participating in commerce. Contemplating the importance of morality considers the parallel
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role that war and commerce have had with each other in history. As war becomes a less viable
method of participation in the international arena, either through shifts in morals or advancing
military engineering, more states turn to commerce as their means of having an international
impact, thus increasing the strength and extent of commerce.
One could say that commerce has found its niche with gentle mores, or the opposite, but
the truth remains that gentle mores and commerce are almost always found together (SL XX.1).
Since commerce exposes different states to various mores and manners, it corrupts pure mores
and flees from destructive prejudices, for it does not thrive when one set of values maligns
another that it is supposed to interact with through trade. The exposure of different mores softens
the mores of all who partake in commerce, deterring war by providing an alternative arena.
In discussing commerce, Montesquieu aptly points out that he is “dragged along by a
torrent” (SL XX.1), for the amount of critical thinking that could go into the topic, commerce, is
beyond the scope of The Spirit of the Laws; beyond the scope of any one piece of writing. The
effect of commerce is one that Montesquieu argues naturally leads to peace, though it does not
eliminate warfare. Rather, commerce has the effect of making warfare less appealing, for the
benefits that a nation can obtain through commerce exceed those it could take through conquest.
For powerful nations, this is a deterrent of war, helping prevent wars based on economic
interests; for other nations, this is a way to establish mutual dependency, ensuring both states can
gain without the need for destruction. Through these exchanges, commerce spreads the mores
throughout the various nations and there they are compared, curing destructive prejudices and
preserving gentle mores (SL XX.1), causing not the eradication of war, but an elimination of
reasons for war to exist.

Moore 28

Reference Sources:
Howse, Robert. 2006. “Montesquieu on Commerce, Conquest, War, and Peace.” Brooklyn
Journal of International Law 31 (3): 1-16.
Long, Katya. 2008. “The ‘anti-Hobbes’? Montesquieu’s Contribution to International Relations
Theory.” In-Spire Journal of Law, Politics and Societies 3 (2): 88-101.
Long, Katya. 2010. “Civilising International Politics: Republicanism and the World Outside.”
Millennium Journal of International Studies 38 (April): 773-96.
Montesquieu. 1989. The Spirit of the Laws. Translated by Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller,
and Harold Samuel Stone. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Radasanu, Andrea. 2012. “Montesquieu on Ancient Greek Foreign Relations: Toward National
Self-Interest and International Peace.” Political Research Quarterly (January): 1-15.
Rosow, Stephen. 1984. “Commerce, Power and Justice: Montesquieu on International Politics.”
Review of Politics 64 (July): 346-66.

